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Abstract
This article reviews the now extensive literature on the varied arenas
in which restorative justice is theorized and practiced—criminal vio-
lations, community ruptures and disputes, civil wars, regime change,
human rights violations, and international law. It also reviews—by
examining empirical studies of the processes in different settings—
how restorative justice has been criticized, what its limitations and
achievements might be, and how it might be understood. I explore
the foundational concepts of reintegrative shaming, acknowledg-
ment and responsibility, restitution, truth and reconciliation, and
sentencing or healing circles for their transformative and theoretical
potentials and for their actual practices in a variety of locations—
family abuse, juvenile delinquency, criminal violations, problem-
solving courts, indigenous-colonial-national disputes, ethnic and
religious conﬂicts, civil wars, and liberation struggles. Restorative
justice, which began as an alternative model of criminal justice,
seeking healing and reconciliation for offenders, victims, and the
communities in which they are embedded, has moved into larger na-
tional and international arenas of reintegration in political and ethnic
conﬂicts. This review suggests that there are important and serious
questions about whether restorative justice should be supplemen-
tal or substitutional of more conventional legal processes and about
how its innovations suggest potentially transformative and challeng-
ing ideas and “moves” for dealing with both individual and group
transgressive conduct, seeking peace as well as justice.
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INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTS,
DEFINITIONS, AND PURPOSES
OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
To its conceptual and practical founders
(John Braithwaite, Howard Zehr, and Mark
Umbreit, among others), the ﬁeld of restora-
tive justice is an effort to transform thewaywe
think of punishment for wrongful acts. When
a crime or serious bad act (which may include
more classes of activity than those legally la-
beled criminal) occurs, it effects the victims,
offenders, interested bystanders (such as fam-
ily members, employees, or citizens), and the
larger community in which it is embedded. To
paraphrase one of the ﬁeld’s founders (Zehr
2002, Zehr & Mika 1998), these bad acts or
ruptures in human interaction create needs
and responsibilities for the direct participants
in the act, as well as for the larger society
in which their act(s) occur. Restorative jus-
tice is the name given to a variety of differ-
ent practices, including apologies, restitution,
and acknowledgments of harm and injury,
as well as to other efforts to provide heal-
ing and reintegration of offenders into their
communities, with or without additional pun-
ishment. Restorative justice usually involves
direct communication, often with a facilita-
tor, of victims and offenders, often with some
or full representation of the relevant affected
community,1 to provide a setting for acknowl-
edgment of fault by the offender, restitution
of some sort to the victim, including both af-
fective apologies and material exchanges or
payments, and often new mutual understand-
ings, forgiveness, and agreed-to new under-
takings for improved behaviors. In its most
idealized form, there are four Rs of restorative
justice: repair, restore, reconcile, and reinte-
grate the offenders and victims to each other
and to their shared community.
Restorative justice raises deep philosoph-
ical, sociological, and empirical issues. The
philosophical literature focuses on the pur-
1The notion of what the community is in restorative justice
is one of some controversy (Weisberg 2003).
poses and nature of wrongdoing and punish-
ment (Gabbay 2005, Blumenson 2006) and is
only brieﬂy reviewed here. At both the philo-
sophical and sociological level, restorative jus-
tice raises important questions about who
should have power, control, and possession
over crime, acts of wrongdoing, punishment,
restitution, reconciliation, and community in-
terests (Christie 1977,Menkel-Meadow1995,
Von Hirsh 2003). When an act of wrong-
doing is committed, who has an interest in
its rectiﬁcation: the victim, the community,
the offender, those affected by the act, or
the larger society? Who decides what jus-
tice is: the victim (who might want vengeance
or restitution), the state (who will want to
deter future crimes and acts of wrongdoing,
set precedents for others, and establish so-
cial control), or the community in which the
wrongdoing is embedded (where motivations
may vary from revenge to the desire to re-
claim every community member)? Who has
the power to forgive and accept restitution or
reconciliation: the victim, the victim’s family,
the community in which the wrong occurred,
or the state? What if acts of wrongdoing af-
fect both individuals and a larger commu-
nity, such as hate crimes or genocides? If
crime or other acts of wrongdoing are a col-
lective hurt or tear in the social fabric, can
individuals forgive on behalf of anyone be-
sides themselves? Are crime victims adequate
proxies for the rest of a society that may
deﬁne justice differently (more harshly, less
harshly)?Howarewe to knowwhat theproper
unit of analysis is for measuring appropriate
forms of punishment or restitution? What is
the proper balance between victim-offender
reconciliation, community peace, and social
order or justice? (Similar issues have been
raised in the civil sphere of dispute process-
ing; see Menkel-Meadow 1995, 2006.) How
should we integrate both the public and pri-
vate aspects of crime andwrongdoing? Should
right-making ofwrongdoing be backward fac-
ing (punishment and legal justice) or future
facing (reconciliation, restoration, and social
justice)?
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Whatever one’s views on these impor-
tant philosophical and criminological issues,
the question remains: Does restorative justice
work? Does it meet its own claims of reduced
recidivism, restored communities, and reinte-
grated offenders? Is restorative justice more
efﬁcient (less costly, more deterrent, more
restitutionary) than more conventional forms
of punishment? Is it more fair or just (as per-
ceived by participants or as analyzed by exter-
nal, objective, and professional measures of
these illusive concepts). This article reviews
the extant ﬁndings, which do demonstrate
some support for restorative justice claims,
while also raisingquestions about the (limited)
conditions under which restorative justice
may be most effective. The next major issue
of evaluation in the ﬁeld is whether even suc-
cessful victim-offender restorative justice can
be scaled up to national levels of political and
civic reconciliation, either through truth and
reconciliation–like processes or through repa-
rations (Bradford 2005, Brooks 1999, Brophy
2006).
Restorative justice as a social practice and
movement began, in its modern incarnation,
in the 1970s as a response to what was consid-
ered to be an overly harsh criminal justice sys-
tem that neither effectively deterred crimenor
successfully rehabilitated offenders. Champi-
oned by social workers, progressive criminal
treatment professionals (including police of-
ﬁcers and prison reformers), some lawyers
and judges, psychologists, and community and
peace activists, restorative justice was prac-
ticed ﬁrst (Lerman 1999), and theorized later,
most eloquently by John Braithwaite (1989,
1995, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2006). Restorative
justice proponents suggested that by provid-
ing structured environments in which offend-
ers and victims met and explained their in-
juries and hurts to each other, offenders could
acknowledge and explain their bad acts, apol-
ogize, and make restitution to victims who
could forgive and feel safe again. With fam-
ily members or community representatives
present, there would be public accountabil-
ity, an inquiry into root causes of criminal
or wrongful acts, and, at its best, suggestions
for creative, tailored solutions. Restitutionary
possibilities would emerge from facilitated di-
alogue. Through structured shaming (Kahan
1996, 2006; cf. Markel 2007), responsibility
taking, and acknowledgment of injury done,
offenders might be effectively reintegrated
into their communities, and victims would no
longer be frightened or traumatized by what
had happened to them.
From the beginning, restorative justice
practices were intended to heal at both the
individual and group or social level. Attention
in both practice and theory was placed on
healing those directly affected by a crime or
bad act and on institutional and social reform.
At its most aspirational or utopian, restorative
justice has been seen as a potentially transfor-
mative social practice that could, under the
right conditions, obviate the need for harsh
criminal punishment and incarceration. In
this conception, restorative justice was linked
as a social movement to community orga-
nizing, criminal justice and prison reform,
the civil alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
movement (Menkel-Meadow et al. 2005), and
the peace movement in that it sought alterna-
tive processes for different and more humane
and tailored outcomes. In its more grounded
and practical institutionalized forms, restora-
tive justice was often supplemental, not
substitutive, to conventional criminal pro-
ceedings. In an early core deﬁnition of
restorative justice, it is a “process that brings
together all the parties affected by an incident
of wrongdoing to collectively decide how to
deal with the aftermath of the incident and its
implications for the future” (Marshall 1998,
Roche 2004). Although some think restora-
tive justice is most appropriate in the context
of small, interpersonal wrongful acts, such as
petty thefts, simple assaults, drug- or alcohol-
related crimes, and family abuse, restorative
justice has been adapted for cases involving
murder, rape, genocide, and other serious
transgressions against large groups or even a
whole society (Umbreit et al. 2005, Wellikoff
2004). It has also been used effectively as
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a model for pre- or nonlegal disputes in
schools, organizational and corporate conﬂict
management, neighborhoods, communities,
and families (Llewellyn & Howse 1998).
What began as a domestic social re-
formmovement (simultaneously developed in
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United
States, the Netherlands, Austria, and oth-
ers), restorative justice and its basic princi-
ples became a process of international in-
terest when Desmond Tutu (1999) led a
truth and reconciliation process to transform
and heal South African society’s transition
from apartheid to a just, multiracial society.
Variations on indigenous [such as Rwandan
gacaca (Honeyman 2004, Bolocan 2004,Raper
2005) and Ugandan mato oput (Blumenson
2006)] and newlyminted restorative processes
(Avruch & Vejarano 2001) have now been
used in more than 25 national efforts to move
more peacefully through political, racial, eth-
nic, and civil wars and transitions to more
peaceful, democratic, and just states. Restora-
tive justice principles thus helped form a new
ﬁeld of international law and political struc-
ture: transitional justice (Teitel 2000).
Restorative justice has several foundational
concepts that have now been elaborated and
extended tomany arenas of social and political
interaction:
 Personalized and direct participation in
a process of speaking and listening of
both a wrongdoer (offender) and a vic-
tim of an act of wrongdoing;
 Narration of what an act of wrongdoing
consisted of and the harm or injury it
caused to those affected (including both
direct victims and often others, includ-
ing bystanders and the larger commu-
nity);
 Explanation by the offender of what was
done and why;
 Acknowledgment and acceptance of
fault for the wrong committed by the
offender with recognition of the harm
caused (with apology, if not coerced);
 Opportunity for appreciation or under-
standing of why the wrong occurred
(root causes) and, in some cases, forgive-
ness of the individual, without forgetful-
ness of the act;
 Consideration of appropriate outcomes
or restitution to those wronged by all
participants, including victim, offender,
family members, and/or larger commu-
nity, often with expert facilitation;
 Reintegration of the wrongdoer into
the larger community, through apol-
ogy, restitution, and/or support and so-
cial services provided (alone or in con-
junction with formal punishment as
well);
 Reconciliation of wronged and wrong-
doer, within a renewed commitment to
shared social norms (often reconstituted
within the restorative process);
 An orientation to the wrongdoer that
treats the act separate from the person
so that the person may be redeemed as
the victim/community is repaired;
 An orientation to the future, to the ex-
tent possible, to make right what was
wrong and to rebuild new relationships
and new communities.
These foundational concepts come from a be-
lief that conventional legal processes (crim-
inal, international tribunals, and even civil
processes) are often ineffective in their bu-
reaucratic separation of offender from the
actual consequences of acts, in the timing
of any remedial actions (delayed incarcera-
tions or other punishments), and in the inat-
tention to the personal nature of the wrong
(both for rehabilitation of the offender and
restitution of the particular harm suffered by
the victim), not to mention in their failure
to deter or reduce crime. Restorative justice
hopes to harness the commission of wrong-
ful acts to the making of new opportunities
for personal, communal, and societal growth
and transformation through empowerment of
both victims and offenders in direct and au-
thentic dialogue and recognition. It also hopes
practically to reduce recidivism and reinte-
grate wrongdoers intomore positive roles and
relationships.
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At the theoretical level, most proponents
of restorative justice claim that such processes
reclaim the property of the crimes or conﬂicts
from their ownership and mismanagement by
the state (Christie 1977) and return them to
the victims and offenders whose lives aremost
affected. As with the civil ADR movement,
restorative justice proponents claim that out-
comes can be creatively tailored to meet the
requirements and needs of the situations and
the parties. Thus, there will be higher rates
of compliance and greater satisfaction with
the process itself, encouraging belief in its le-
gitimacy and its ability to rectify wrongs and
repair broken or harmed social relationships.
Restorative justice is designed to remove neg-
ative stigmatization of the individual and re-
place it with recognition of the wrongful-
ness of an act, with shaming of the act, and
with reintegration of the person (Braithwaite
2002; Strang 2001, 2004). As an ideology and
as a practice, restorative justice often appeals
across the political spectrum, with liberals
seeking criminal justice reform through per-
sonalized treatment, compassion, and under-
standing for socially disadvantaged offenders,
and conservatives approving of offender ac-
countability, responsibility, and restitutionary
payments to victims (Barnett 1977). When it
works most effectively, restorative justice en-
hances participatory and deliberative democ-
racy and can promote community building,
political legitimacy, and the development of
new social and legal norms. Progressive the-
orists and practitioners see in restorative
justice another form of participatory delib-
erative democracy; conservative theorists see
devolved and localized governance for crime
control.
Although there are many contested the-
oretical and practical issues in the uses of
restorative justice at its different levels (per-
sonalistic wrongs, less serious crimes, seri-
ous crimes, state crimes, crimes or wrongs
against humanity) that are reviewed below,
recent scholarship (Strang 2004, Johnstone
2003, Roche 2004, Strang & Braithwaite
2000, Minow 1998) on these issues has en-
abled a relatively coherent set of issues, re-
search questions, and objections to be de-
veloped across levels of analysis and uses of
restorative processes. Such issues include:
1. Whether restorative justice processes
are effective in meeting their own
claimed advantages, such as reduced re-
cidivism rates; increased rates of rein-
tegration to a nonoffender life; move-
ment toward reconciled, postconﬂict
societies;
2. Whether victims feel coerced or black-
mailed to participate, forgive, forget,
and forego (desires for revenge or other
retributivist goals) (Acorn 2004, Brown
1994);
3. Whether offenders feel coerced to con-
fess, apologize, and waive the rights of
the criminally accused (Dolinko 2003,
Delgado 2000, Brown 1994);
4. Whether restorative processes—like
other alternative processes that focus
on direct, but informal, narrative—
privilege some (the articulate, the
verbal) and disadvantage others [the
less verbal; the racially, gendered, or
class-based disadvantaged (Young 1990,
2000; Daly 2002, 2005; Cahn 2006)];
5. Whether certain classes of wrongdoing
should never be submitted to restorative
processes, e.g., serious crimes such as
murder, rape, or wrongdoing in which
society as a whole, not just individ-
uals, is affected, such as genocide or
hate crimes (Robinson 2006, Rugge &
Cormier 2005);
6. Whether particular wrongdoers or of-
fenders (or victims) should be excluded
from restorative processes, e.g., repeat
offenders, the mentally impaired, those
who are remorseless;
7. Whether psychological or socially
based communication technologies at
the individual level are effective for
macro institutional, national, and larger
social problems;
8. Whether restorative justice can or
should substitute entirely for state and
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formal criminal sanctions and punish-
ments or whether it should be a totally
informal and voluntary supplementary
process;
9. Whether restorative justice ismore eco-
nomically and criminologically efﬁcient
(less costly, more deterrent) than con-
ventional criminal justice methods;
10. Whether a focus on future remediation
or right-making diminishes important
concerns about blame for past wrongs
(Menkel-Meadow 2004, Grillo 1991);
11. Whether individualized forms of
restorative justice can meet the re-
quirements of equity-based justice
or equality when similarly situated
offenders are provided with differential
outcomes (Robinson 2006);
12. Whether privatization of justice in the
criminal context (whether individual
or at larger state levels) deprives us
of the public function of courts, tri-
bunals, punishments, and precedent-
setting (Luban 1995);
13. Whether private criminal justice can
operate within the shadow of the law,
with both the potential coercion of the
state as a threatened alternative, or as a
weak substitutewhere there is no formal
law enforcement (international criminal
law);
14. Whether participation in restorative
justice procedures enhances both indi-
vidual and communitarian sensibilities
for empowerment, fairness, legitimacy,
satisfaction, and social justice;
15. Whether restorative justice is a spiri-
tual, utopian project, with a faith in hu-
man ability to be transformed, at both
individual (Katz 1990) or group lev-
els (Gibson 2004a), and whether it can
be harnessed to practical, institutional,
large-scale social and legal change.
This article reviews the claims made for
restorative justice and the difﬁcult and com-
pelling issues raised by its use and offered by
its critics to discount its achievements and
possibilities. I begin by recounting some of
the history of restorative justice in its var-
ious forms, with its differentiated claims. I
then explore some of the most trenchant cri-
tiques that have been made of restorative jus-
tice at philosophical, social, political, jurispru-
dential, and practical levels. Next, I report on
what we know to date about how restorative
justice actually works from a variety of empir-
ical sources, including several meta-analyses
performed by others. Finally, I suggest what
issues and challenges lie ahead for both the use
and assessment of restorative justice efforts in
individual, community, national, and interna-
tional efforts to deal effectively with human-
inﬂicted harm.
FORMS AND MODELS OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Although in one sense restorative or restitu-
tionary justice is as old at least as the earli-
est forms of classical justice in Greek, Arab,
and Roman legal culture (Braithwaite 2002),
modern restorative justice traces its origins to
objections to both retributivist and failed re-
habilitative models of criminal law and pun-
ishment. Victim control of the prosecution
of wrongful acts was a common practice be-
fore the modernization of the criminal jus-
tice system in the late Middle Ages in Europe
(Langbein 2003) relocated the management
of crime from private citizens to the state.
State control of crime developed to provide
revenue for the state (in ﬁnes and punish-
ments) and more order and control (and eq-
uity) in the treatment of offenders. State con-
trol of criminal acts was also a product of
the fear of vigilante or vengeance motives on
the part of victims, which actually perpetu-
ated violence, as needs for less bloodthirsty
and more orderly outcomes were required,
not only as religious, social, and humanitar-
ian values evolved, but also to provide some
predictability for the growing commercial so-
ciety and increasingly centralized political or-
der (Thompson 1976). Although ﬁnes and
jail terms began to substitute for blood feuds
in postmedieval Europe, elements of violent
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retributivist and vengeance-seeking systems
of justice continued to coexist with local
restorative forms of community moots or me-
diation inmany cultures.Thehistory of crimi-
nal justice and punishment is one of increasing
state control and surveillance (Foucault 1979),
with concomitant increased costs of public in-
stitutions and public responsibility, with little
demonstrated reduction of crime, violence, or
antisocial acts (cf. Zimring 2006).
The twentieth century was certainly the
most violent of all centuries at nation-state,
group, and individual levels, even with the
modern criminal and penological apparatus
that had developed by then. Aside from Anglo
and middle European criminal justice models
of punishment (incapacitation, incarceration,
retribution, rehabilitation), other legal cul-
tures have long focused on restorative, repara-
tive, or restitutionary forms of justice, includ-
ing community moots, wise elder mediation,
religious forms of repentance and reparation,
and various forms of communal conferenc-
ing (nanante, ubuntu, gacaca) in the Middle
East, Africa, and Asia and peace circles in in-
digenous American (both North and South)
cultures. All these forms of justice or dis-
pute resolution involve some narration before
victims, offenders, family members, support-
ers, community members, and leaders, with
communally arrived at outcomes (ﬁnes of ani-
mals, crops, other goods, ormoney; reparative
work; and often ritual ceremonies of healing
and forgiveness, including the sharing of com-
mon food and drink, as well as dances, songs,
and other expressive activities). Most repar-
ative forms of justice were scaled to smaller
communities where mobility for both offend-
ers and the community was limited and con-
tinuing face-to-face contacts with community
members were the norm.
As state control embracedmore social con-
trol of criminal offenders, both through for-
mal legal processes and therapeutic interven-
tion models, reformers began to experiment
with new forms of handling (I never say man-
aging) wrongdoing. In the early 1970s, both
in Canada and the United States, contem-
poraneously with similar movements in civil
and family law toward mediation, experimen-
tal programs in victim-offender reconciliation
programs (VORP) or victim-offender media-
tion (VOM) (Umbreit 1994) were established
alongside or within progressive court sys-
tems, some as diversionary programs for mi-
nor crimes, others as independent processes.
By the mid-1990s, there were hundreds of
programs in many states and provinces of
the United States and Canada. These early
programs focused on facilitated conversations
of wrongdoers, victims, and family members
both as supporters and as possible disciplinar-
ians or enforcers. These programs sometimes
served as alternatives to state prosecutions
(dismissals if victims agreed and were oth-
erwise made whole). VORP and VOM were
often founded by social reformers, progres-
sive criminal law professionals (including po-
lice, probation and parole ofﬁcers, and social
workers and some lawyers and judges), and,
notably, by religious groups, such as theMen-
nonites, who brought their reparative philos-
ophy to bear on all forms of conﬂict resolution
(Zehr 1990, Lederach 1997).
Some of the developments in the 1970s
were sparked by First Nation practices in
Canada (Stuart 2001) for “peace or sentenc-
ing or family circles” used both for internal
wrongs committedwithin tribes and then later
expanded to First Nation land and other dis-
putes with the larger nation-state (Bradford
2005). These practices enlarged the notion of
whowas a proper participant or stakeholder in
conﬂicts involving harm to other members of
the community. A more ﬂexible, tailored, and
communitarian sense of justice or fairness, in-
cluding group responsibility for bringing in-
dividuals back into the community, charac-
terized many of these programs. “Healing or
peace circles” of a variety of North American
native groups, including the Navajo (Yazzie
& Zion 1996), brought native practices to the
attention of conventional court systems. Pro-
cesses including “talking sticks” that rotate
among participants and equalize who will talk
(especially in leaderless groups) are radically
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different from legalistic and adversarial con-
frontations. The purpose of such conferences
is often not to assess fault or guilt (with fact-
ﬁnding), although there is narration of what
happened and why, because usually fault or
guilt is admitted. The purpose of the circle
or conference is to consider the best ways to
make the victim whole or compensated and to
consider various forms of treatment or reinte-
gration of the wrongdoer. With the emphasis
on remedial approaches (for both victims and
offenders), considered from a collectivity (the
community, tribe, family, or other represen-
tatives), power is not located in a single judge,
and the norms that are referenced may be ne-
gotiated and interpreted for particular cases,
with less emphasis on formal rules and stan-
dards. These processes have many variations,
including referral back to courts if wrongdo-
ers do not admit fault or victims are not sat-
isﬁed with apologies or restitutionary offers
when laws have been violated. In other cases,
the state may defer to some other form of au-
thority (Indian tribes, local law enforcement,
etc.), provided there is full participant consent
or other legal authorization.
Perhaps the greatest and deepest impact of
these new processes was seen inNewZealand,
where family conferencing modeled on both
traditional Maori and modern practices de-
veloped into a mandatory model for juvenile
justice (Maxwell & Morris 1993). Here the
movement represents collaboration among
mainstream conservative and social demo-
cratic political parties, Christian profamily
groups, and Maori philosophy and participa-
tion (Braithwaite 2002). In such family confer-
ences, alternative structures to conventional
adversary adjudication involve the juvenile of-
fender, teachers, social workers, family mem-
bers, victims, and others who jointly develop
a package of restitutionary payments or ser-
vice, apologies, and plans for future behavior,
often in lieu of incarceration. In sentencing
circles, a community grouphelps develop pro-
grams and proposals for compensating victims
and preparing behavioral plans for ameliora-
tion of the conduct of the offender. Such pro-
grams, of course, have their critics (see be-
low), both for coercing compliance and also
for reduction of criminal defendant rights
in nations with strong civil liberties protec-
tions (Delgado 2000). There is also some ev-
idence that, when used in smaller, homoge-
neous communities (which are felt to be more
oppressive to some adolescents than the cold
state), there is an increased risk of ﬂight from
the community (Marshall 1998).
In the United States, the states making
most use of these programs are Minnesota,
Vermont, Wisconsin, Maine, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, and Montana, which employ
various forms of victim-offender programs for
juveniles and for postconviction, probation,
parole, and “creative” sentencing. Less use is
made currently at the federal criminal level
because of determinate sentencing laws (Beale
2003), although in earlier periods, the federal
courts varied by region in how they deliv-
ered tailored justice to particular offenders,
with contrasting retributivist and rehabilita-
tive goals (Utz 1978). A new development in-
cludes “problem-solving courts” (Kaye 1997,
Berman et al. 2005) in which restorative and
rehabilitative principles have made their way
into the formal justice system, as special-
ized courts in drug offenses, vice, abuse, ne-
glect, and other family issues have developed
more reparative sentences, including person-
alized treatment programs, some elements of
restorative shaming, and some structured en-
counter with victims, as well as regular report-
ing and accountability (e.g., drug tests) to the
court itself (Dorf & Sabel 2000).
Restorative justice programs are intended,
in ideology, to be purely voluntary, but as-
pects of restorative justice have been co-opted
into mandatory diversionary and formal court
programs, raising questions of philosophical
purity and efﬁcacy and challenging efforts to
measure the impact of these programs. Some
models of restorative justice have been used
in prisons, concurrent with and adjunct to for-
mal punishment, and observers fear that some
offenders may pay twice with formal crim-
inal sanctions and demands for less formal
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restitutionary or shaming rituals that re-
duce their human dignity (Nussbaum 2004).
Restorative justice processes can also be
used following release, as conditions of pa-
role or probation, connecting the offender
to agreements with victims or the commu-
nity for social service, compensation, or ac-
countability for behavioral change. Although
restorative justice is motivated by those seek-
ing humanistic integration, it is easy to see
how some restorative justice forms can ap-
pear oppressive, reducing freedom of action,
and individual agency and requiring intrusive
surveillance and accountability that can de-
volve into counterproductive resentment.
Restorative justice has, in recent years, in-
formed a variety of other legal and political
processes. John Braithwaite argues for its ef-
fectiveness as responsive regulation in mat-
ters of corporate and public policy regulation.
When state regulators engage in negotiated
conversations with managers of corporations
and industries (such as nursing homes, trade
groups, commercial enterprises), Braithwaite
(2002) argues, compliance is greater and dia-
logues allow more realistic, ﬂexible, and con-
tingent enforcement of important legal stan-
dards (see also Hawkins 1984).
Dispute resolution theorists and practi-
tioners have argued that public and delib-
erative encounters in regulatory, civil, and
criminal matters can be seen as a new form
of governance, promoting healthy democratic
deliberation that is more participatory, le-
gitimate, and ﬂexible in its legal and social
problem solving when matters are openly
negotiated with many stakeholders and when
multiple issues and multiple parties are in-
volved in the deliberations (Menkel-Meadow
2004, Elster 1995, Bohman 1996).
In the 1990s, restorative justice practices
movedoutward from individual acts ofwrong-
doing to the systematic wrongdoing of civil
and ethnic wars (by both intra- and inter-
national state and nonstate actors) and ille-
gitimate regimes such as apartheid. The use
of TRCs and similar public panels of en-
counters of victims and offenders and the
larger nation-state and international com-
munity has given rise to whole new insti-
tutions of justice (Avruch & Vejarano 2001,
Minow 1998, Stromseth et al. 2006). These
truth commissions are intended to provide
a new national narrative as victims seek an-
swers and information about their individual
family members [what happened to the disap-
peared (Argentina, Chile), the murdered, or
the incarcerated (Guatemala, Rwanda, South
Africa)], as well as the truth about state-
sanctioned violence and harm (Sierra Leone,
East Timor). As discussed more fully below,
the challenge for these various and quite di-
verse TRCs has been to ensure participation
by both victims and perpetrators, which in
many cases is not a direct encounter as inmore
conventional criminal restorative justice prac-
tices, in settings where there is mostly talk or
testimony and not real punishment or restitu-
tionary relief.
At the national or institutional level of
restorative justice, the goals may be quite
different than in more individualized acts of
wrongdoing. The commissions are designed
to heal the nation-state or civil community by
allowing many narratives of hurt and harm to
be told and by creating new collective nar-
ratives of the truth so that a society can be-
gin anew with transformative understandings
of both its past and its future. Like the use
of restorative justice in more individual set-
tings, the efﬁcacy and effectiveness of these
processes have been debated and questioned
(see below), but these processes are clearly
evolving and offer great promise of adapt-
ing to different political, cultural, and his-
torical contexts and may ultimately transform
our conceptions of international justice. As is
more fully explored below, as scholars and po-
litical activists assess and debate their effec-
tiveness, there are particularly rich encounters
between the international human rights com-
munity (with rights-based conceptions of jus-
tice) and the international conﬂict resolution
and peacekeeping communities (with more
realist and pragmatic conceptions of post-
conﬂict regimes). Differences of theoretical
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paradigms, of assumptions about human be-
havior, of philosophies, and of commitments
(such as to the rule of law or to pragmatic,
informal actions of nongovernmental organi-
zations) and practices may themselves have
to be mediated to make these new forms of
justice meet their aspirational goals, either
alongside conventional legal structures (with
conventional international or national pros-
ecutions of the most serious atrocities) or
as substitutes for them (in less serious cases
in which redemption, reassimilation, or even
co-optation of past aggressors may be possi-
ble or desirable for security and continuity
of regimes). The newer forms of truth and
reconciliation practices combine tiered sys-
tems of prosecution (for most serious crimes)
and confession and restorative justice for less
serious offenses (Honeyman 2004, Hayner
2001). Whether these alternative institutions
are public or private is also a crucial issue.
The South African TRC proceedings were
televised to the whole nation, but virtually all
of the Latin American commission proceed-
ings (Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala) were
privately conducted (even with publication of
formal reports).
CRITIQUES OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE
Most proponents of restorative justice appeal
in visionary, optimistic, and aspirational terms
for a new human sensibility to emerge from
the transformative effects of dialogue, con-
versation, empowerment, and understanding,
from individual juvenile offender advocates
to architects of the most complex truth and
reconciliation governmental processes or for-
mal state institutions, such as problem-solving
courts. The claims made on behalf of restora-
tive justice are simultaneously instrumental,
incremental, and grand:
 Restorative justice enhances under-
standing of the root causes of crime and
conﬂict;
 Outcomes reached in restorative justice
are more likely to be complied with;
 Restorative justice processes reduce re-
cidivism rates;
 Restorative justice offers the possibil-
ity of reclaiming, repairing, and trans-
forming individual wrongdoers and
reintegrating them into productive
activity;
 Participants in restorative justice pro-
cesses are more likely to develop
fellow-feeling, empathy, and a sense
of moral responsibility, mutuality, and
reciprocity;
 Restorative justice processes enhance
community building, community norm
development, and democratic partic-
ipation by increasing the number of
stakeholders who are involved in its
deliberations;
 Restorative justice permits more real,
less formal, less stylized or legal human
communication and interaction, pro-
ducing more authentic understanding;
 Restorative justice processes are richer
at expressing a variety of often com-
peting justice values simultaneously—
acknowledgment of fault, recognitionof
consequences that ﬂow from wrongful
activity (punishment, remorse), com-
pensation to victims, social learning
and healing, mercy, as well as moral
judgment—and are thus more creative
and ﬂexible and represent a form of
responsive justice (Nonet & Selznick
1978) that is humanely civilized and not
as brittle as formal adversarial justice
structures;
 Processes using restorative justice val-
ues aremore likely to engage individuals
in voluntary commitments for under-
takings to others and self and to encour-
age self-empowerment and self-esteem;
 The underlying values of restorative
justice promote a positive redemptionist
and ameliorative view of human behav-
ior, with a positive hope that even the
worst among us can be transformed to
consider the common good and the best
for other human beings;
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 Outcomes produced by participatory
restorative justice processes are more
tailored to the speciﬁc needs of indi-
viduals, groups, communities, and na-
tions; they can be bargained for with
more nuance, detail, and accountabil-
ity than those produced by formal and
overbooked systems of justice;
 Restorative justice is potentially less
costly and more efﬁcient both in mone-
tary and deterrent effects than conven-
tional penological practices;
 If the principles of restorative justice
were to gain ascendancy, the criminal
justice system would be radically trans-
formed (less punitive and more respon-
sive), if not eliminated.
Since the practices of restorative justice in
all of the forms described above have been de-
veloping and attempting to express these aspi-
rational values, a core of critiques of restora-
tive justice has emerged at different levels and
from the perspectives of different disciplines.
There are empirical claims that restorative
justice does not meet its own claims (see next
section) (Braithwaite 2002, Daly 2002, Van
Ness 1993); philosophical and sociological
claims that humans continue to carry base re-
tributivist and vengeful motivations that are
impervious to so-called transformative pro-
cesses (Acorn 2004); legalistic claims that
restorative justice unfairly coerces andmanip-
ulates its participants to forgive (victims) or
confess and accept harsher terms (offenders)
than legal rights and rules would permit in
formal justice institutions and that restorative
justice does not deliver equitable or equal jus-
tice (Dolinko 2003, Delgado 2000); anthro-
pological critiques that concepts in restora-
tive justice ideology are culturally speciﬁc and
not universal (Avruch & Vejarano 2001) and
that notions of community are social con-
structs and can be manipulated for bad ends
(Weisberg 2003); and political claims that
restorative justice processes will be manipu-
lated, corrupted, co-opted, and deformed to
produce oppression, more state surveillance
and discipline, and more inappropriate social
control (Abel 1982, Levrant et al. 1999).
In addition to these critiques, speciﬁc
critics have suggested that, like civil ADR,
restorative justice privatizes that which should
be public (Luban 1995), prevents precedents
and rule generation for community norm
development, and hides its outcomes from
measurement and evaluation. The location
of restorative justice (whether in or along-
side courts or as private conferencing sessions)
problematizes the relation of the state to law
enforcement and shared governance with pri-
vate entities (a larger issue that clearly impli-
catesmore than restorative reforms in this age
of public-private partnerships).
Criminologists worry that restorative jus-
tice will lead to subjective, nonobjective, and
nonrational assessments of harm and need
and will produce great inequities for both
victims and offenders. What is extremely
painful to one victim may be tolerable for an-
other. Whether victims receive recompense
and restitution will depend not on the qual-
ity of the offense, but on the resources of
the offender. Philosophers such as Nussbaum
(2004) decry the potential degradation and
loss of humanity that can come from com-
pelled shaming. Acorn (2004) argues similarly
about the effects of coerced compassion on
the part of victims, who have been seriously
harmed and are made to feel ashamed about
their desires for punishment, vengeance, and
retribution. In these claims, we see that the
very promise of restorative justice to be more
authentic has the potential to be less authentic
than other forms of structured and rule-based
discourse because of its compelled or expected
narratives. When the harm is not only per-
sonal but social, how can the offender satisfy
the needs of the community for rectiﬁcation
and safety with a simple (even if authentic)
apology (Robinson 2003, 2006)?
Within the restorative justice movement
itself, practitioners and theorists have their
own worries (Braithwaite 2002, pp. 137–
68) that offenders may be stigmatized in a
different, but harmful, way than they are
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stigmatized in formal court proceedings; that
victims can feel revictimized in their retelling
of pain or injury suffered [comparable to the
rape victim’s dilemmas in the formal adjudi-
cation system (Matoesian 1993)]; that oppres-
sive or false communities in societies that are
actually heterogeneous will attempt to im-
pose their own values on participants in the
process; or that even with community homo-
geneitymore conservative ormajoritarian val-
ues may gain ascendancy and dampen indi-
vidual freedoms (Weisberg 2003). Although
conceived as a part of a progressive move-
ment for social justice, the appeal of restora-
tive justice to the Christian Fundamentalist
Right in the United States has caused some to
be concerned about whether restorative pro-
cesses will be used for antiprogressive ends
(imposing conservative, antiliberationist, nar-
rowly religious, or monocultural values). Or,
with less conservative ends, governments may
simply co-opt such processes to achieve their
ends (diversionary programs, docket clearing,
more social control and surveillance devolved
to nonstate actors) and thus routinize and
make less authentic the human encounter and
engagement contemplated by restorative jus-
tice proponents. Like civil forms of ADR in
such processes as consensus building, collab-
orative governance, negotiated rulemaking,
and multi-agency mediation, some worry that
the separation of powers and accountability in
constitutional governments will be obscured
and made difﬁcult to monitor. Lawyers, in
particular, worry about how informal pro-
cesses, while serving some ends of responsive
and ﬂexible justice, can erode other important
values—individual civil rights, standards for
convictions, rights of appeals, written opin-
ions, and accountability of decision makers.
Feminists have been strong critics (and
proponents in other contexts) of restorative
justice models that decriminalize violence
against woman and seek lesser punishments
and no incarceration for wrongful acts that
have only recently achieved some formof legal
recognition (Daly 2005, Stubbs 1995). Prac-
titioners worry that processes that are struc-
tured around dialogue and narrative (Young
2000) may privilege the verbal and well ed-
ucated and disempower those without educa-
tion or other resources. And others worry that
restitution commodiﬁes crime and wrongdo-
ing by allowing offenders to buy their way
out if they can (Kahan 2006). Imprisonment,
at least in theory, is a great equalizer in
incapacitation.
Finally, restorative justice requires well-
intentioned, nonmanipulative participants
and sufﬁcient resources to allow authentic en-
counters and dialogue to occur.Thus, even for
some proponents of restorative justice, there
is a fear that restorative justice can only work
with large commitments of time, resources,
and skilled individuals and must necessarily
be deformed and watered down to ritualized
imperfections if it is assimilated, aggregated,
and institutionalized without sufﬁcient care
and resources.
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENTS OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: DOES
IT WORK?
There are many challenges in assessing the
claims of both proponents and critics of
restorative justice at the conceptual and
methodological levels.Most importantly, as in
assessments of all comparative forms of jus-
tice or legal case processing, including civil
dispute resolution, it is virtually impossible
to conduct controlled experiments or treat-
ments of submitting the same matter to dif-
ferent treatment conditions for comparison.
In both criminal justice matters and larger
conﬂicts, ordinarily there is only one treat-
ment of the matter or, if several treatments
are used, the treatments are used for differ-
ent purposes or at different times [such as
use of VOM for remedy but not guilt assess-
ment, triaging, or grading of crimes against
humanity that are assigned to formal pros-
ecution or more restorative processes, such
as gacaca in Rwanda (Bolocan 2004)]. So, al-
though a few controlled studies are emerging
in which there is random assignment of cases
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to either restorative justice or more conven-
tional models of process, the bulk of empir-
ical evaluations of restorative justice efforts
focus on aggregate comparison data, with at-
tempts at matched cases or data sets of differ-
ent forms of treatment or intervention. Exam-
ples include efforts to assess (a) comparative
compliance rates with agreements or judg-
ments; (b) satisfaction rates for victims, of-
fenders, professionals, and the larger com-
munity with different processes and outcome
possibilities; (c) reoffender or recidivism rates;
(d ) reduction of violence generally [commu-
nity measures beyond those of participants
in the process (Zimring 2006)]; and (e) in
the case of TRCs, whether postconﬂict soci-
eties build efﬁcacious systems of governance
with legitimacy, compared with societies that
have not used such processes (Stromseth et al.
2006).
The second challenge is to deﬁne and op-
erationalize themeaning of variables assessed.
As several new meta-analyses have shown,
over the course of many years of study, such
variables as reoffense rates vary enormously
from study to study, thereby greatly con-
founding analysis. In some studies reoffense is
measured in short time intervals (six months);
in others longer (up to two years or more).
Some studies cut ﬁnely and look at degrees
of severity of offense (simple and single prop-
erty offenses, simple to repeated assaults) and
others look only at whether there is a subse-
quent conviction or, quite differently, simply
another arrest. Because it is easiest to mea-
sure, with exit interviews or follow-up meth-
ods, the most common factor studied is a
crude measure of satisfaction with the pro-
cess (and/or outcome), tracking the now rich
and robust ﬁndings of procedural justice at-
titudes (MacCoun 2005, Thibault & Walker
1975). These ﬁndings demonstrate that the
processes generally favored are informal pro-
cesses that give participants voice and that
have some cathartic effect in response to the
dispute or act of wrongdoing. And these infor-
mal processes are favored even when parties
lose (or do not gain much) in outcomes. Here
again, the comparisons are analogical, rather
than experimental.
Aggregate studies compare satisfaction
rates of those who have used the conventional
justice system with those who have attended
some alternative process (Kakalik et al. 1996,
Lind et al. 1989), but it is virtually impossi-
ble for the same participant to compare treat-
ment in the two types of processes in the same
case, leaving open the possibilities that case
factors and other variables may account for
process satisfaction. For example, in oneof the
most rigorously designed tests of comparative
civil case processing, LaFree & Rack (1996)
found that race and ethnic matching of third-
party neutrals (whether mediators or judges)
with participants (Anglo-white, Hispanic, or
African American) accounted for some of the
comparative satisfaction rates of disputants
(and also explained some of the variance in
outcomes in the two processes (mediation or
adjudication).
At the level of assessing themore ambitious
truth and reconciliation or societal restorative
processes, measurements are even more com-
plex and difﬁcult to assess. Should individuals
be polled about satisfaction (those who have
participated and those who have not)? Is it
possible, as some political scientists have at-
tempted, to compare rates of internal con-
ﬂict and civil wars over time and between
nation-states and also to measure aggregate
levels of international conﬂict (Stein 1993)
when different conﬂict resolution processes
are used? As the growing literature on TRCs
and postconﬂict interventions indicates, there
are great variations in the purposes, struc-
tures (direct or indirect encounters and tes-
timonies, amnesties or punishment, types of
matters subject to informal processes, public-
ity and accessibility of such processes, loca-
tion, type of third-party interventions or facil-
itations), and functioning of these innovations
in justice. Comparisons across widely differ-
ent political, social, and cultural contexts may
be quite difﬁcult.
Despite these methodological problems,
the emerging data often provide not only
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conﬁrming or disconﬁrming information
about the claims and hypotheses about
restorative processes, but also, in some cases,
information about new and perhaps unin-
tended effects of such processes, such as
Gibson’s (2004a,b) ﬁndings on the develop-
ment of human rights consciousness among
those who viewed (on national television) the
South African Truth and Reconciliation pro-
cess, even if they did not participate directly
(see below).
Here I present an overview of what stud-
ies to date have revealed about how restora-
tive justice is working or is perceived to be
working, in a variety of locations, with great
variations in purpose, structure, and use.
The greatest claims for restorative jus-
tice, in its most conventional forms in crimi-
nal justice—that it creates greater compliance
with agreements or judgments, reduces im-
prisonment (and therefore costs to the sys-
tem), provides greater satisfaction for both
victims and offenders, and reduces recidivism
rates—have all been substantiated in a vari-
ety of different studies on at least three con-
tinents (North America, Australia and New
Zealand, and Europe), despite methodolog-
ical difﬁculties in almost all settings. Com-
parisons between systems (restorative and
conventional-retributivist) are difﬁcult when
the participants do not engage in both types
[and satisfaction rates with informal processes
tend to be high, whether in civil cases (medi-
ation, arbitration, or other forms of ADR) or
criminal cases (see Lind et al. 1989, Kakalik
et al. 1996)].
Some studies focus on participation rates,
noting that even when referred by courts (in
less than voluntary settings) many offenders
choose to admit guilt and attend mediation
with their victims. (In virtually all court pro-
grams, defendants who do not admit guilt and
instead seek trial are not referred to VOM.
Thus, how voluntary a guilt admission is re-
mains a worrisome issue.) Participation rates
for victims range from 40% to 60% of those
referred. Interestingly, participation rates for
victims go up when more time elapses be-
tween referral and participation in cases in-
volving personal injury (assault), but decrease
when more time elapses in cases involving
property (theft, vandalism) (Umbreit et al.
2005). There is a curvilinear relationship for
participation rates of victims and the serious-
ness of the offense, with participation rates
lowest for less serious offenses (“I can’t be
bothered”) and for the most serious (fear of
the offender or reliving the trauma in seri-
ous bodily harm cases) (Coates&Gehm1985,
Wyrick & Costanzo 1999).
Many studies have demonstrated high sat-
isfaction rates on the part of both offend-
ers and victims who feel they were treated
better in restorative justice processes than in
the criminal justice system (Poulson 2003,
reviewing 7 selected studies out of 100 on
psychological outcomes of restorative justice),
often with satisfaction rates greater by a fac-
tor of 3 to 4. Studies in such diverse loca-
tions as Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (McCold &
Wachtel 1998); Brooklyn, New York (Davis
et al. 1980); Canberra, Australia (Strang et al.
1999, Strang 2001); Israel (Umbreit & Ritter
2006); a multi-state U.S. study (Umbreit &
Coates 1992, Umbreit et al. 2001); Canada
(Umbreit 1995); and the United Kingdom
(Umbreit & Roberts 1996, Marshall & Merry
1990); along with meta-analysis of multiple
studies (Latimer et al. 2001), with diverse sets
of victims (female, young, old, low andmiddle
socioeconomic classes) and offenders (most,
but not all of the studies focus on juvenile
offenders, with increasing attention to adult
offender programs as restorative justice prac-
tices expand) all ﬁnd that victims have satis-
faction rates higher than what they had ex-
pected to gain from a process following injury
and harm. Offenders are much more likely to
feel they have been treated fairly. Offender
satisfaction rates with restorative justice com-
pared with court processes tend to be higher
than victims’ satisfaction (typically because,
in minor offenses, participation in restora-
tive justice proceedings may eliminate other
forms of punishment, including incarceration,
although in some programs offenders might
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havehad their cases totally dismissed in amore
conventional setting).
Both victims and offenders report satis-
faction with their ability to narrate and ex-
plain more fully both the harm and injury
that wrongdoing caused in particular circum-
stances and the reasons for committing bad
acts. On the victim side, there is a slightly
lower perception that their opinions were
takenmore seriously in restorative justice than
in court, compared with offenders (Poulson
2003).And, in an important and rigorous anal-
ysis in Australia, victimswhose restorative jus-
tice proceedings were badly handled or did
not take place were the least satisﬁed [less
satisﬁed than court users and participants in
more successful restorative justice proceed-
ings (Strang 2001)]. Thus, the quality of the
restorative justice process may be especially
important when there are high expectations
about what it can accomplish. Participants
generally expressed satisfaction with the fair-
ness of mediators or third-party facilitators
over judges [by a factor of 2.3 for victims and
6.0 for offenders (Poulson 2003)].
Victims have been satisﬁed with what
they perceive to be greater accountability in
restorative justice (Poulson 2003), and, not
surprisingly, victims were more likely to for-
give the offender in restorative justice pro-
cesses than in court proceedings, probably
because offenders are much more likely to
apologize [6.9 times more likely according to
Poulson’s (2003) meta-analysis] than in court
proceedings.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, re-
searchers have attempted to track compli-
ance rates with reparation and compensa-
tion agreements. Although many argue that
restorative justice does not require an agree-
ment but rather seeks understanding and dia-
logue, studies document that agreements for
some sort of restitution are highly likely to
occur [more than 90% in VOM programs
in which there is face-to-face contact, with
some form of restitutionary agreement being
reached in the vast majority of cases (Umbreit
et al. 2005, Umbreit 2001, Umbreit & Coates
1992)]. Compliance rates range from a high of
100% to usually no lower than about 75%, in
comparison with control groups with diver-
sionary or other sentences from courts (see,
e.g., Haley & Neugebauer 1992, Marshall
1998, Kuhn 1987, McCold & Wachtel 1998).
Latimer et al.’s (2001) meta-analysis of eight
studies with a control group found that resti-
tutionary compliance was 33% higher in
restorative justice cases than in the control
cases (in court). Other studies in the United
States have found comparisons of compliance
of 81% completion rates in restorative justice
with 58% completion in court cases (Umbreit
et al. 2005). And in a randomly assigned treat-
ment evaluation of six different programs,
89% completion was found in restorative jus-
tice, comparedwith 75%completion in courts
(Ervin & Schneider 1990).
Satisfaction rates for victims are often at-
tributed to the nonmaterial or human as-
pects of the process—the ability to explain
in regular language (not court-stylized ad-
missible evidence) what the harm caused has
meant for the individual, to learn facts relat-
ing to the wrongdoing, and to learn a little
bit about why an offender does bad things.
In his meta-analysis of seven studies, Poulson
(2003) found that victims who participated
in restorative justice proceedings were half
as likely to feel upset about the crime after-
wards than were victims who went to court.
In the places where restorative justice is used
in very serious crimes, such as murder or se-
rious felonies, the effects of restorative jus-
tice are often only in this nonmaterial realm—
accountability and apology by the wrongdoer
and some relief in the form of closure or
forgiveness for the survivors (Umbreit et al.
2003), because in very serious cases (murder,
rape, and serious assault) restorative justice is
ancillary or supplemental, not substitutionary,
to formal adjudication. In its most spiritual
forms, restorative justice is experienced as a
cathartic event, both for victims and offend-
ers. As one participant described it, “Today I
have observed and taken part in justice admin-
istered with love” (Braithwaite 2002, p. 53).
www.annualreviews.org • Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work? 10.15
ANRV327-LS03-10 ARI 13 July 2007 21:27
Indeed, some have asked whether an apology
from a murderer might provide greater psy-
chological closure (at least for some) than the
death penalty (Hirsch 2006).
Perhaps the greatest empirical effort has
been expended on examining what concrete
and measurable effects restorative justice has
had on recidivism rates. In a meta-analysis
of 19 studies with 9307 offenders ( juveniles),
Nugent et al. (2003) found that VOM par-
ticipants were 33% less likely to reoffend
within six months than those who had not
participated in VOM. This rigorous meta-
analysis recognizes important categorical and
coding issues—different studies deﬁne reof-
fense differently (arrest, conviction, any new
contact with the criminal justice system), and
the time period in which an offender is fol-
lowed can have important effects on the ﬁnd-
ings. Generally speaking, over longer periods
of time (as the offender moves further and
further away from the VOM event), recidi-
vism rates move closer together for restora-
tive and conventional criminal justice partic-
ipants (Nugent et al. 2003). These data must
be compared with the general rates of decline
in juvenile delinquency with the ordinary life
course (which some estimate at as much as
50% who no longer offend when they grow
older; see McCord 2000). Victimless crimes
(like some forms of drunk-driving and some
drug offenses) may be less subject to restora-
tive justice–court differences as the encounter
with a victim is minimal (with a state ofﬁcial
standing in for the harm the crime caused)
(Strang 2001). And comparisons of recidivism
rates are subject to great selection biases, with
themoreminor crimes or those committed by
juvenilesmore likely to be assigned to restora-
tive, not conventional adjudicative, treatment
conditions (Braithwaite 2002, Bazemore &
Walgrave 1999, Bradshaw et al. 2006, Pfeiffer
1998). Finally, empirical studies, with rare ex-
ception, tend to homogenize offenders and do
not capture the offender who commits crime
“for the thrill of it” and may not be deterred
by either restorative justice or conventional
criminal processes (Katz 1990).
John Braithwaite and other researchers
studying regulatory enforcement have doc-
umented that compliance with regulations
is often higher (and rates of repeated non-
compliance lower) when regulated industries
and corporate actors are actively engaged
in discussions of compliance and allowed to
talk with their regulators (Braithwaite 2002,
Hawkins 1984). Inspections of mine safety (in
the United States and the United Kingdom)
that involved exit conferences with dialogues
and plans for reparation were much more
likely to lead to compliance with rules and
increased safety standards. Braithwaite found
that persuasion worked much more effec-
tively in the corporate compliance context
than did punitive measures. Similar results
have been noted in nursing home regulation,
special education (Handler 1986), and nuclear
power regulation in a ﬁeld now internation-
ally called “communitarian regulation” (Rees
1988, 1994) [not unlike American reg-neg
(negotiated rulemaking); see Harter 1982].
Uses of restorative justice in controversial
arenas such as domestic abuse have met with
criticism by feminists and some child advo-
cates, but in fact many studies do report some
success with nonrecidivism in some forms
of family conferencing and other forms of
restorative justice (Burford & Pennell 1998).
There has been less rigorous demonstra-
tion of successful uses of school peer medi-
ation or antibullying to reduce school vio-
lence (Braithwaite 2002, pp. 59–61), although
such efforts continue, especially in the wake
of recent violent school shootings. Most of
the United States was treated to its ﬁrst pub-
lic display of restorative justice when the
Amish families who lost children in a school
shooting in Pennsylvania forgave the wrong-
doer, prayed with his widow, and created
an image of freedom as “the freedom from
vengeance, which is forgiveness” (Fleming
2006, Arendt 1998). Although not a restora-
tive justice process with the actual offender
(those who prayed together were all families
of either themurderer or his victims andwere,
thus, all survivors), this demonstration of
10.16 Menkel-Meadow
ANRV327-LS03-10 ARI 13 July 2007 21:27
religious forgiveness was quite contrary to the
images presented of more vengeful parents in
other school shootings (such as Columbine,
Colorado).
With the expansion of restorative justice to
specialized reparative courts, like drug courts,
vice courts, and uniﬁed family courts, re-
searchers have just begun to explore rigor-
ously whether new treatmentmodels with less
punishment reduce recidivism, increase em-
ployment, or have other ameliorative effects
for both individuals and the larger commu-
nity. Dorf & Sabel (2000), for example, have
studied drug courts’ effectiveness and have
argued that these experiments in local so-
cial control should be allowed to ﬂourish and
vary as evaluators seek to discover what works
(such as ongoing relations with social work-
ers and accountability to judges and other
court personnel) in which contexts [big cities
with larger budgets and more resources or
smaller communities with more gemeinshaft
or surveillance (depending on whether one
has a Weberian or Foucaldian perspective)].
Courts that treat defendants as members of
a community have been documented as be-
ing perceived to be more fair than conven-
tional courts (Frazer 2006), and perceptions
of fairness are linked to increased compliance
(Tyler & Huo 2002). These efforts to evalu-
ate problem-solving courts are controversial,
especially among those who see restorative
justice institutions as formally abrogating le-
gal rights in the name of remedial creativity
(Thompson 2002). With restorative justice’s
analogue in the debate about use of bargain-
ing processes for negotiated rulemaking in ad-
ministrative regulation and civil law (Harter
1982, Coglianese 1997, Freeman 1997), crit-
ics fear that softer processes will undermine
legal formality, separation of powers, formal
legal accountability, and enforcement, as well
as ordered norm and rule creation.
Evaluation of restorative justice’s rehabil-
itative potential recapitulates the historical
dialectic of all judicial reform. Nineteenth-
century reformers created juvenile courts to
be a more responsive, less punitive, pater-
nalistic institution for wayward youths. Civil
libertarian litigation in the 1960s produced,
among other cases, In re Gault (1967), which
infused juvenile criminal proceedings with le-
gal rights, such as the right to legal counsel
and, some would argue, more punitive out-
comes. Restorative justice, like its analogues
in civil justice, is a reaction to an over-
rigidiﬁed, bureaucratized, punitive, and inef-
fective (at crime reduction) criminal law sys-
tem, which now has its own critics for drawing
different lines around individual and collec-
tive, formal and informal, material and spir-
itual, rights-based and interest-based values.
Where restorative processes are supplemen-
tal, not substitutional, of the conventional le-
gal process, they are more likely to be ac-
cepted. Yet some would prefer other reforms
of the criminal justice system to remedy its
problems. Some argue for less plea bargain-
ing and faster, more responsive trials to al-
low defendants and victims to come to formal
justice faster. Others argue for less draco-
nian sentencing, both in length of time and
severity, to return to earlier reform efforts
at more rehabilitative notions of criminal re-
mediation. Still others argue for decriminal-
ization of certain offenses (minor property
crimes, drug offenses) or more localization of
criminal law enforcement, whereasmore con-
servative forces argue for harsher sentences
and criminalization of more offenses. In the
political standoffs surrounding criminal jus-
tice policy, restorative justice appears to be
one reform that appeals to both sides of the
political spectrum, if for different reasons.
Beyond the conventional criminal jus-
tice system, efforts to expand restorative and
reparative processes to larger acts of wrong-
doing (Elster 2006) [state violence, genocide,
civil wars, ethnic conﬂicts, international hu-
man rights violations, and past wrongs such
as slavery and internment (Brophy 2006)]
have also pitted restorative reformers against
more formal rights-based reformers. The
activity of nongovernmental organizations,
the United Nations, and other organizations
in enunciating and enforcing human rights
www.annualreviews.org • Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work? 10.17
ANRV327-LS03-10 ARI 13 July 2007 21:27
standards has created whole new institutions
of formal prosecution at the international
level [the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (Hagan 2003) and
for Rwanda and the International Criminal
Court, amongothers]. Proponents of enforce-
ment of international human rights argue for
strict criminal prosecution, whereas others
argue that some forms of reparative justice
[whether individualized (Godobo-Madikizela
2003) or more collective (Keller 2007)] are
more likely to lead to healed and function-
ing postconﬂict societies, replicating timeless
philosophical debates about the relative ef-
ﬁcacy of principle, adjudication, and rights
versus interest- or needs-based bargaining
(Elster 1995; Menkel-Meadow 1984, 2003).
The rapid execution of Saddam Hussein after
prosecution in a state (not international) tri-
bunal, cutting off further testimony, informa-
tion, and maybe public remorse, has reignited
debates about how justice is delivered in such
contexts. Whereas some tribunals have been
international and otherTRCs are nation-state
based, other efforts have experimented with
more mixed combinations of international
and state-based institutions (Sierra Leone,
East Timor).Meanwhile, complex legal issues
of whether international bodies, such as the
International Criminal Court, should bend to
national policies of amnesty or forgiveness re-
main unresolved (Blumenson 2006).
Attempts to study the aftereffects of TRCs
and more local, indigenous restorative pro-
cesses, such as gacaca in Rwanda, now abound,
with heated debate and controversy (Borer
2006, Henkin 2002, Rotberg & Thompson
2000, Kritz 1995, Avruch & Vejarano 2001,
Hayner 2001) as many nations have ﬁled for-
mal truth reports with a variety of repara-
tive conditions (Guatemala, Argentina, Chile,
El Salvador, South Africa, Sierra Leone, East
Timor). Questions of whether international
or local principles of justice should govern are
now being raised as well (for their effects on
postconﬂict legitimacy of the legal processes
used and the creation of new postconﬂict na-
tional identities, see Ivkovic´ & Hagan 2006).
International tribunals are often viewed as
aligned with one side in ethnic conﬂict, as
some have argued has occurred in the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, thus prolonging hostility and pro-
moting continuing desires for vengeance.
Some decry the lack of participation by
important perpetrators, such as Dyzanhaus’s
(2003) exposure of the absence in the South
African TRC of apartheid-era judges, who
failed even to narrate and acknowledge their
crimes against humanity in upholding the le-
gality of the apartheid regime. Others more
forcefully critique the absence of any real pun-
ishment, accountability, or reparative com-
pensation (Andrews & Ellmann 2002, Abel
1995) for horriﬁc wrongs, not to mention the
failure to confrontmore long-lasting harms—
not only discrimination, wrongful murders
and incarceration, and removal of civil lib-
erties, but also continuing gross economic
injustice, with little effort to ameliorate,
even with well-written and democratically ap-
proved constitutions, the continuing condi-
tions of inequality, poverty, and increasing
crime among the have-nots. Some fear that
having written a report and formally repented
as a government, instead of “nunca mas!”
(never again), Argentina and Chile, among
others, could just as easily fall again into
the clutches of brutal dictators (especially as
Pinochet successfully avoided full account-
ability for his crimes). Whether postconﬂict
or postdictatorship societies can put aside
their past hostilities and sharp divisions and
seek more moderate third ways or alterna-
tive strategies without fully coming to terms
with the past remains to be seen. Democrat-
ically elected regimes are certainly fragile in
the former Soviet Union and parts of Eastern
Europe, whereas Latin America appears, as of
this writing, to have turned a democratic cor-
ner, even while left and right cleavages remain
strong in many countries. Optimistic citizens
hope that past atrocities of military dictator-
ships have inoculated civil societies against
ever again permitting them to exist, but his-
tory cautions against deﬁnitive conclusions,
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especially when economies are so volatile and
inequality remains so pervasive, if not worse
than in earlier decades. In the United States,
arguments are made for truly restorative jus-
tice, not only in the nonmaterial form of
apologies for slavery, Japanese American in-
ternment, andNative American genocide and
property expropriation (Bradford 2005), but
for material reparations to be paid to descen-
dants of the victims of these social and po-
litical crimes (Brophy 2006, Ogletree 2002).
Indigenous groups throughout theworld have
begun to make similar claims and to ﬁle na-
tional civil and international claims and law-
suits, seeking a variety of forms of justice, in-
cluding land claims, monetary compensation,
and self-determination and self-governance.
Nevertheless, as the debate between the
past and future continues in the practices of
truth and reconciliation panels or other forms
of transitional justice and in thepages of schol-
arly reports, some rigorous empirical analy-
sis has suggested that, as with the law of un-
intended consequences, other effects may be
generated by such alternative justice systems.
Gibson’s (2004a,b) recent study of post-TRC
South Africa demonstrates powerfully that
thosewho viewed at least some of the televised
Truth and Reconciliation proceedings were
much more likely to adopt a human rights
consciousness than were those who did not
view any of the proceedings. Even in a setting
with racially differentiated beliefs in the efﬁ-
cacy of the rule of law, exposure to the wrong-
ful acts of apartheid and their public condem-
nation increased some perceptions of the need
for political and racial tolerance and respect
forminorities within amajoritarian rule of law
conception. Thus, the transformative, educa-
tional effects of such processes may have ben-
eﬁts for those outside of the victim-offender
dyad (and are why so many restorative jus-
tice projects seek to include community rep-
resentation and some form of publicity or
transparency). These processes are not only
for the active participants or victims of the
speciﬁc act of wrongdoing or harm. To the
extent that formal justice systems are about
providing public norms and accountability
and remedying harm to the larger commu-
nity, public restorative justice processes have
been empirically demonstrated to provide ed-
ucative, participatory, democracy-enhancing
potential, through radically different formats
and with potentially wider reaching effects.
THE FUTURE OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
Restorative justice is more of an idea, philos-
ophy, set of values, or sensibility than a single
concrete and uniform set of practices or pro-
cesses. In some settings, there is direct com-
munication, confrontation, and reconciliation
of victims and offenders; in others, there is
more indirect restorative justice (Tickell &
Akester 2004, Utah Law Review 2003, Mar-
quette Law Review 2005), using procedures
similar to caucusing or separate meetings,
as in civil mediation, especially when direct
communication between offenders and vic-
tims might make things worse or too painful
(as in some murder, rape, and other serious
crimes). In some settings, restorative justice
is only for the victim and offender, promising
safety, conﬁdentiality, and tailored, individu-
alized, reparative, and conciliatory outcomes.
In other settings, more public participation
is crucial [by those affected by the wrongful
conduct, family members, supporters, treat-
ing or representative professionals, the larger
community, and, in its most public forms such
as TRCs, the larger society (O’Hear 2004,
2006)].2 What began as an idea to reduce the
punitive nature of conventional criminal pun-
ishment (especially for juvenile offenders and
victimless crimes) and to improve the out-
comes of criminal justice has developed into
2Restorative justice processes have been demonstrated in
documentary ﬁlms, focused on the actual operation of a va-
riety of processes, or actually televised for an entire society,
as with the South African TRC. More recently, restorative
justice was depicted in a 2006 British ﬁlm, Breaking and
Entering by Anthony Minghella, which concludes with a
juvenile criminal family conference in London.
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a social and political movement seeking to
use restorative or reparative sensibilities to
heal not only single acts of misconduct, but
civil wars, genocides, and international,multi-
ethnic, political, and religious conﬂict.
Restorative justice as a social move-
ment has been both constituted by and
works in collaboration with other politi-
cal movements—peace studies, nonviolence
advocates and practitioners, civil ADR and
conﬂict resolution process proponents, in-
ternational human rights activists, participa-
tory and deliberative democracy theorists and
practitioners (Menkel-Meadow 2005), and
those who believe in responsive or dialogic
regulation and justice (Pavlich 1996, 2005).
What these movements have in common is
a belief that more ﬂexible, humane, dialogic,
conversational, and authentic human engage-
ment can end a cycle of misconduct, pun-
ishment, retribution, vengeance, and more
bad acts and violence by both individual-
ized and systematized processes of turning the
other cheek, including authentic responsibil-
ity taking, accountability, and restitutionary
outcomes leading to forgiveness, reconcilia-
tion, and reintegration. These are large, aspi-
rational, almost utopian ideas and goals, in-
formed by a basic optimism about humans’
ability to engage in social learning and behav-
ior modiﬁcation at both individual and large
group levels. Efforts to operationalize such
grand notions at so many different levels are
still experimental, evolving, and fragile. As so-
cial scientists and political leaders try to assess
whether notions of reconciliation and reinte-
gration can substitute for more punitive and
retributivist institutions, theywill have to con-
front a variety of challenges to these processes,
including:
 Whether processes that may work on
smaller scales ( juvenile criminal offend-
ers, community sentencing circles) can
be scaled up to national and interna-
tional conﬂict settings without com-
promising the basic ideas of restorative
justice;
 Whether restorative justice requires
shared values at the community, nation-
state, or international level to be ef-
fective, or whether something less than
unanimity or consensus can be appealed
to in seeking human reconciliation after
acts of wrongdoing;
 Whether the informality, conﬁdential-
ity, and ﬂexibility of restorative jus-
tice threatens important human and
legal rights (publicity, representation,
due process, anticonfessional rules, eq-
uity and proportionality in punish-
ment) or whether human rights and hu-
man problem-solving processes can be
reconciled;
 Whether informality, conﬁdentiality,
and ﬂexibility in the sanctioning of
wrongdoing compromises needs for
public processes, public norm genera-
tion and enforcement, and transparency
and equity;
 Whether restorative justice processes
should be supplemental or substitution-
ary to more conventional processes of
punishment and prosecution;
 Whether restorative justice processes
themselves privilege some over others
(the verbal, well resourced, represented,
willing, clever, or manipulative);
 Whether authentic participation in
restorative processes and rituals is pos-
sible in any mass, multi-valued, and di-
versely constituted community or soci-
ety and whether participation in more
micro, speciﬁc case situations can trans-
form individuals and societies on a
macro level to engage in more delib-
erative and responsive solutions to bad
situations;
 Whether the basic philosophy of sep-
arating bad acts from bad people can
be an effective notion for dealing with
modern, group, and mass-level harmful
acts.
These challenges are many and profound.
Not listed above are the more practical
challenges of structuring, supervising, and
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monitoring the operation and effectiveness
of restorative justice programs. As restorative
justice ideas are propelled from one domain
to another, both ideas and institutionalized
practices are themselves transformed to meet
the needs of particular communities. There
is always the danger of co-optation, both
by the larger system and by individuals who
learn to work the systemwith insincere apolo-
gies, offers of restitution or reparation, or
other inauthentic performances. How insin-
cere participation can and should be discov-
ered and disciplined (in a nonfact-ﬁnding en-
vironment) remains a serious conundrum for
restorative justice advocates. Whether rules,
standards, and best practices can or should be
generated to assure quality of process or some
uniformity across or within domains remains
an important policy issue in this ﬁeld.
Yet, with all these challenges, we know that
restorative justice has reduced recidivism and
reoffense rates in many programs (with both
juveniles and adults); that restorative justice
processes, with more direct and responsive
communication and negotiation, can gener-
ate new norms that are more reﬂective of
changed circumstances or enhanced human
understanding; and that even merely observ-
ing a restorative justice process or ritual can
have social learning and transformative ef-
fects on how human beings conceive of their
rights and responsibilities in a modern and di-
verse world. As social scientists develop rigor-
ous evaluations of how these programs work
in different settings, at different levels, with
different purposes and structures, and with
comparisons to relevant conventional pro-
cesses, we will learn more about how restora-
tive and reparative philosophies and practices
may transformpunitive formsof social control
with more optimistic ideas about human em-
powerment, understanding, problem solving,
and reconciliation after events of individual
and group ﬁssures. If, as the saying goes, you
can get more bees with honey than with vine-
gar, perhaps we can get more social progress,
peace, and justice with healing than with
punishment.
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